

Genl Breda's Army

THE
CONDUCT
OF OUR
OFFICERS,
AS WELL

GENERAL as INFERIOR,
IN THE LATE
BATTLE near *TOURNAY*,
EXAMINED;
AND THE
True Causes of our Defeat assign'd,

IN
A New and more Authentic Account of
the whole Action, than any that has yet
been publish'd,

Non tam Magnum est gloriam adipisci, quam pro-
meruisse. CICERO.

L O N D O N:

Printed for M. COOPER, at the Globe in Pater-
noster-Row, 1745.

[Price One Shilling.]

THE
CONFIDENTIAL

OF THE

OFFICE

OF THE

GENERAL SECRETARY

IN THE

BATTLE OF BATTLE

EXAMINED



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OFFICERS *of the* ALLIED ARMY

IN THE

Late Action near FONTENOY, &c.

THE Disappointment and Loss of the Allied Army, in the late unhappy Action near *Fontenoy*, appear of so much Importance, not only in themselves, but in the Consequences which in the present critical Situation of the Affairs of *Europe* must be expected to attend them ; and the whole People of *England* seem so justly, and properly affected by them, that it is Matter of Wonder to me, that no body has yet attempted to set before the Publick a fair and open Account of the Manner ; and an impartial Enquiry into the true Causes of the Misfortune.

Truths of the greatest Importance are indeed often the hardest to come at, and particularly in Cases of this kind, where there are a

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thousand Reasons why at first we cannot expect to learn more of them than it is judged proper we should be told ; but after a Month has past since the Time, no Circumstance of the Truth, I think, can well be hid from any one who will be at the Pains of diligently enquiring after it. While indeed we have but one Account, and that published by Order of those whose Interest it is industriously to conceal the worst Part of the Story from us, 'tis no wonder if we believe it better than it really is ; and if it be also the Interest of the same Persons to keep us ignorant of the true Manner and Causes of it, 'tis no more a Wonder if we are led into imputing it to wrong ones, and taught to be lavish in our Praises of those whom we ought most severely to censure, and to censure whom we ought most to praise : But when we have a Multitude of Accounts from different Quarters published, and a Number of private Letters (which indeed when we know the Persons who write them, we often know are more to be depended upon than all the public Accounts in the World) to refer to, to confirm, or contradict them, I cannot but think it very possible to get at even the whole Truth.

If therefore by comparing our own Accounts, with those of our Enemies, with the private Letters we have received, and with one another, the true State of the Case may

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at length be come at ; if we can find it certain to a Demonstration that we have been either accidentally, or industriously misled in our Judgments concerning it, I cannot but think it common Justice to lay it open to the public View, and that an honest Attempt to set the whole Circumstance of the Action in a true Light will be kindly accepted by those who feel themselves so much affected by it.

Absolute Impartiality in a Thing of this kind, is the first and most immediately necessary Qualification for the attempting it ; and whoever goes about it, ought to be first arm'd with the free Tongue, as well as the free Heart of an *Englishman*, and be ready with as little Reluctance to give up his Father if he thinks him guilty, as to bestow his Praises on his Enemy if he finds he has deserved them.

It might indeed seem strange, that among the Multitudes who have so just a Sense of the Effects of this unhappy Defeat, there should be so few who form a proper Judgment of its Cause ; but this will appear the less surprizing if we consider how few there are who have the least Opportunity of a fair Knowledge of the Facts they ought to build their Judgment on, and that those who appear to have the greatest and best Opportunities of this kind, have perhaps the least and worst, and are not only, not in a Way

to come more nearly at the Truth than others, but have a Number of additional Bars to keep them from it in what they think the Methods of learning it. The generality can only judge by the public Accounts, and the few who imagine they have better Opportunities of being informed by their knowing People in some Degree concerned for, employed under, or related to, Persons more immediately concerned in it, have, as I before observed, so many Hinderances to their true Knowledge of the Facts in the very Things they think the Means of learning them. For beside the Hazard such Persons stand of being misinformed themselves, will not the Relation and the Friend be apt to sink the Honour or the Infamy of the Day in his own private Wishes ; and tell the Story not so as may do the Truth most Service, but so as may do his Friend or Brother the most Honour ? Ought not the Dependant (as he will think) to lay the Blame any where (no Matter for the Truth) rather than at his Patrons Door ? And must not the Man in Office tell the Story as he is commanded to tell it ? Where then is the Truth to be found but in the Breast of him who knows how to separate, by Means of numerous Witnesses, the Truth from Falshood ; to compare the Confirmations or Contradictions the several Accounts give to each other ; to make the proper Allowances for the Passions and Interests of the

Authors

Authors of each of them, and to select from among the Multiplicity of private ones, what come from the Unprejudiced, and therefore, may be most reasonably believed. For from the Accounts at home, even those talked of among such as must know as much, though, possibly, not exactly the same with what they pretend to know, 'tis evident that unless we could divest Men of their various private Passions, Interests, Friendships, Hatreds, and above all, Dependencies, we can learn nothing.

To lay aside, therefore, the various prejudicial Opinions, of I know not what imaginary Faults and Follies in our Officers, I look upon it that the immediate Cause of our Defeat was, the Courage and Conduct of our Enemies; which was evidently such as must have conquered any Troops that were not either greatly more numerous, or, at least, equally valiant, and led on by Officers equally studied in the Tricks of War with their own; in this, however, I know I differ strangely from the Authors of all our other Accounts, both private and public, who think it so absolute an Impossibility for a *French* Army to beat an *English* one, that if they cannot find a Miracle to account for it, they think they are in Duty bound to lay a Load of Infamy on somebody or other, as they judge
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that somebody or other, must, by their Cowardice, or Villany, have been the Occasion of it. Far be it from me, to blame in any Man an honest Love and Esteem for his Country, provided it be kept in reasonable Bounds; but if it appears, as I think it must, to every seriously thinking Man, that the Esteem of such imprudent Friends would heap an Infamy on that Country which they mean to praise, I hope it may be allowed, at least, pardonable in me to differ from them. Farther yet be it from me, to depreciate the Valour of the *English* Troops. I am pleased to think 'em the best, the bravest, in the World; but I know not why an honest Partiality of this Kind, even granting that my good Opinion were such, should prevent my doing Justice to those of another Nation, which I must declare myself to believe, at least, the Second in the World the best after our own. Nay (whatever the eager Partiality of those Authors of our late Accounts may lead them to imagine) it is our Interest and our Honour to acknowledge them such, and with the World to be of our Opinion; for is it not (at least as much as any thing can be so) to our Honour, since we have been conquered, that it has been, however, by the best and bravest Enemy the World could have furnished? And had it not been more to our Infamy to have been conquered

quered by any other? *Homer*, to make his Heroes great, has made their Enemies so too; and *Aeneæ magni dextra cadis*, was the Consolation given by *Virgil's* Hero to a gallant Enemy whom he pitied and lamented as he perished beneath his victorious Arms. Surely every Man of Judgment, when he sees these Writers of a Day calling the *French*, Boys, Cowards, and Poltroons, must compare them to the foolish Friend of the vanquished Orator of old, whom, when the Philosopher heard exaggerating his Infamy, instead of pleading, as he imagined, in his Cause, by calling his victorious Antagonist Fool, Ignorant, Unskilful, and Unlearned, severely asked him, What then must this Friend of yours be, who could be conquered by such a Wretch?

How much more wisely have the *French* consulted the eternal Honour of their Nation by every where filling their Accounts with the prodigious Strength, the almost resistless Bravery, and amazing Intrepidity of our Forces; most rightly judging *that* their greatest Glory, and labouring at this as the Point on which to establish their Fame, that they have beaten, except their own, the bravest, and best Troops, in the World. And can it be imagined that it is, on the Contrary, to our Honour, to depreciate and degrade the Valour of those Troops by which we have been conquered? No, let us do Justice
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both to them and ourselves, by allowing, That if ever we are brought to a Comparison with them, this, in few Words, must be the Measure of it: That we are equal, at least, to them in Courage, superior in Strength, but much inferior in Cunning. Our Officers, I question not, have found by this last Action, that this is the true State of the Comparison, and if they have now formed from it a different and better Judgment both of their Enemy and of themselves, it is to be hoped the knowing better both our own Strength and theirs, and where the Superiority on each Side lies, will teach them better how they are to engage them, where to avoid Advantages on their Part, and where to seek them on our own. Perhaps a too confident Knowledge of our own superior Strength, has often led us into fatal Errors. *Vis Consili expers mole ruit sua* is a most just Observation of the Poet; and when an Enemy is always sure to know on what we shall build our Hopes, he is one fair Step towards the knowing how to elude them.

That it was in a great measure to this superior Cunning of the *French*, or indeed, to do them no more than Justice, to their superior Knowledge in the Art of War, that we owe our late Defeat, is to me as evident, as it is, That it was to our own superior Strength and Courage, that we owe
our

Blood and Treasure so much the less affected by it. If, indeed, it was our Business to study the Glory of the *French* Nation, and it was only with Intent to adorn and embellish that, that we were sent thither; we could not, perhaps, have better contrived how to augment it, than by leading on a glorious Army to stand by, and be quiet Spectators of their Success against this Place, at a cheaper Rate than the Loss of a Battle. But if, on the Contrary, we were sent to check the Pride, and stop the intended Conquests of that aspiring Nation, to be the Avengers of ourselves and half the World, if the Eyes of all *Europe* were fixed on us as our own and their Deliverers, as on those from whose Arms and Councils they were to expect Peace for themselves, and Safety for their Friends, then let us think how nobly we had answered the Purpose of our Expedition, what Figure we had made in the Eyes both of our own, and other Nations, if we had stood tamely by, and only prayed for the impossible Deliverance of this important Place. Every Man, therefore, who views the State of the Case, in this, the true, and, therefore, the only proper Light, will easily determine whether we ought quietly to have looked on and seen the Loss of it, or whether it was not our Business, our Interest, our Duty, to attack them and make

even a desperate Attempt to raise the Siege.

It will be granted then, I hope, that we were in the Right in attacking the *French*, that we had Reason, that we had Necessity, for doing it; and we may come to the second thing in Question, Whether it was to Cowardice or Temerity in our Officers, or to some other Cause, that we owe the Misfortune of our Defeat.

There may, it must be granted, in the first Place, then, be Circumstances in which a brave and powerful Army may find it impossible, with any Hopes of Success, to attack even a weaker, though both their Interest and Inclination urge them to it. But that this was not the Case in the late Action at *Fontenoy*, that it was not impossible for us to have forced the *French*, and raised the Siege; and, therefore, that That Censure of Temerity, which the natural Love of Defamation has made many so lavishly bestow on those whose Characters ought to deter them from it, is false, is base, and infamous, is evident to the World, even from this unsuccessful Action. The *French* had, indeed, Advantages, but they were no other than what the well conducted Labour of a few Days had given them; how well conducted and how great, was what the Event alone could tell; and we must do them the common Justice to own that

that they were more, and greater, than an Enemy could have imagined them : Their Works were strong, but not impregnable, and tho' we have lost the Glory, and Advantages of the Action, yet it has proved that we were as much superior in the Strength and Goodness of our Forces, as they in the Skill and Number of theirs, and when it is made appear, as that will be the next thing I shall endeavour to prove, that it appeared possible we might have won the Battle, I presume it will be allowed by all, that we were right at least in making the Attack.

What then becomes of this invidious, this illnated and unjust Charge of Rashness in the Commanders, in determining to attack the Enemy in these Circumstances, so boldly talk'd of every where, and by too many with so much unworthy Pleasure insisted on as just and right ? For whether it were to Cowardice in Ourselves, or to whatever other Cause, as that is hereafter to be treated of, that we owed our ill Success in this Engagement, the Thing that must most evidently clear or condemn the Leaders in determining to attempt it, is the enquiring whether it was then to be believed we might have won it : For whatever other Face things put on soon afterwards, if it then appeared to reasonable Persons that there was a fair Prospect of Success, surely there could be no Blame in determining to attempt to gain it ;

it ; and that there was at that Time this fair Prospect of Success, will appear to us as evident, as it did to those who prudently, as well as bravely determined on the Attack, if we will think, as in all probability they did, and as every experienced Commander will and ought to think, that the best and nicest way of judging what the Troops of his Nation can do, is by remembring what they have done. Every one I hope will grant that if our Troops are as good now as they were in the late Wars, they may conquer in the same Circumstances ; and consequently, that if the apparent Disadvantages in the Case of the late Action were not so great as those we have fought and conquered at before, it was but right and reasonable to judge that we might conquer there.

That our Troops are as good now as they were at any Time in the late Wars, is and must be allowed true by all who saw either the Action at *Dettingen*, or this late unhappy one, the Subject of the present Enquiries ; in which, whatever Odds appeared too late against us, and however impossible it proved at last to have obtained a Victory, the Troops tho' they lost it, must be allowed even by their Enemies, the greatest Praise of having deserved to have won it.

Where has the *English* History a nobler Account of the Strength and Bravery of the common Soldiers, than in that of our Foot in
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this Engagement, who though under the miserable Disadvantages of the Horse not being come up to support them, and after having stood for more than three Hours the continual Fire of three terrible Batteries, could drive the *French*, though vastly superior in Numbers, from their Lines, and through a Wood, and afterwards, when thin'd in their Ranks and tired with Slaughter as well as almost sinking beneath their Wounds, could break and drive before them the same Troops, a second Time, though reinforced by seven new Battalions? When and where have single Men more eminently signalized themselves than in this very Action? A thousand Instances of almost unparalleled Bravery in the common Men, visible to every Officer who lived to see the End of that dreadful Day, must prove to them, that they did them no more than Justice in believing them a Match for all the Odds that appeared at first against them; and that even from the Losses of that Day it was evident, that scarce any thing was impracticable to them. Hence then in Justice to the Officers who commanded the Attack, let us turn to the History of our late glorious Wars, and see whether in those Times Soldiers not better than these, as it is evident there never can have been better, have not conquered against more than the apparent Disadvantages of that unhappy Day; which were the Superiority of
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the Enemy in Numbers, the Strength of their Lines, and the Quantity of their Artillery : And whether these ought now to have deter'd us from attacking the *French*, we shall soon be able from the Manner of Reasoning before propos'd to judge ; for when we look back only to the Actions of about thirty Years ago, What were the present Superiority of their Numbers, the Strength of their Entrenchments, or the Force of their Artillery, to compare with those which yielded before the victorious Duke of *Marlborough*, at the Battle of *Malplaquet* ? What were the Numbers of their Forces concerned in this Engagement, to the hundred thousand that fled that Day before us ? What are these Entrenchments to compare to the Woods and natural Mounds that sunk before the Spirit of those Forces ? Or what the Strength and Execution of their Artillery, terrible as it was, and greatly as it has been talk'd of, to that of that dreadful Day against which, as they themselves confess, (who are too wise as I observed before, to be afraid of praising the Courage of their Enemies) they saw us advancing not like Men but Devils, in the Face of whole Batteries, which fired at once directly into our Battalions, without being able to break us, tho' they saw them carry off whole Ranks ? Or what the Slaughter that and all their Force and Stratagems could make at *Fontenoy*, to dishearten

hearten us, who could remember that we then, after losing eighteen thousand Men, had gain'd a glorious Victory? Why then should our Generals make the least Hesitation in ordering the Attack of the *French* Army here, when they remembred that an Army heretofore, which it is evident could not be better than that they now commanded, could gain a glorious Victory and immortal Fame on a hundred thousand of their best Troops, posted between two Woods trebly entrenched, and performing their Duty as well as brave Men could.

If this is then, as I flatter my self it must be allowed, a Proof that there was all the Reason in the World, from the Appearances of Things, to hope that we might gain a glorious Victory, and relieve the Town, by this Attack upon the *French*; let us be just enough at least to throw aside that illnatured and illgrounded Censure, so often already condemned here, tho' so generally yet repeated, and so industriously propagated by one set of People, that it was Rashness to make this Attack; since it is evident that we were bound in Justice, in Duty, and in Honour to make it, and we had all the Reason in the World to hope it might prove successful.

And now we have got thus far and proved the Thing to be right in itself, let us with the same Impartiality proceed to enquire into

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Manner of it, and examine whether the subsequent Plan for the Action was equally proper with the Resolution; whether the Disposition and Order of our Troops was as right as the Business they were going upon.

The *French* we know are a cunning and subtle People, watchful in all Circumstances, ready to take all Advantages, and eternally assiduous to get into the Secrets of their Enemies, nor less careful to keep the whole World out of theirs; and that however unequal they are to us in the Strength and Goodness of their Troops, they must be acknowledged at least equally superior to us in the Art and Management of War. They knew as well of what Importance the Action they were engag'd in was to them, as we did of what Advantage it would be to us to disappoint them; and knew equally that there was no Doubt of our attempting to do it. To this they were conscious that they never were, nor ever will be able to stand before us fairly in the Field, and therefore prudently determined that it was their Stratagems, and not their Force, they must depend upon: According to this Knowledge of themselves and us, they laid the Plan of the expected Battle, as we shall more evidently see when we come to consider the Circumstances of the Action itself; and the Event proved the Truth of their Judgment, for they were every where beaten

ten in the Field, even in those Places where most they wish'd to keep their Ground; and ever victorious in their Stratagems: There was no single Instance in the whole Dispute in which our Strength did not break and destroy them, nor any in which their Designs did not take Place upon us; our Troops not being beaten but call'd off the Field, and their Stratagems never failing of their full Effect, but where the Experience of some of our Commander, who, tho' almost too late, at length saw through them, and strenuously preserved the People from falling a Sacrifice before them.

Let it not be imputed as a Crime to the Commanders of the Allied Army, that they were not in the Depth of all their Secrets, nor particularly acquainted with all those Designs that they, who knew their own immediate Preservation absolutely depended upon them, were cautious enough to keep in a great Measure conceal'd. 'Tis impossible that an Enemy always should know all the Designs of those he fights against; and let those who so warmly and unthinkingly reproach us with the want of Intelligence, remember that we did know of the greatest of their Secrets, the Battery which they thought entirely conceal'd, and which so terribly gall'd us, and was indeed the immediate Occasion of our losing the Victory, tho' we did not know of all that related to it, 'till it was too late to guard against it.

The Disposition of the *French* we must acknowledge, was as advantageous as it was possible for People in the same Circumstances to have made it; they had a River, and a Village, which their Artifice had, to deceive us, burnt, but erected a dreadful Battery on its Ruins, on their Right, another dreadful Battery and another Village, and all defended, in their Centre; so well defended indeed, that they judg'd it impregnable, and built very substantial Hopes on its proving so; and a Wood well planted with Cannon on their Left. Their Camp was on an Eminence, and we were to be climbing up Hill all the Way we were driving them before us, and wherever the Ground was plain, they had run Lines of different Heights, one behind another to embarrass us the more in passing them, where they also knew we must be expos'd to the most terrible Fire of their impregnable Batteries all the while we were about it. They had also Batteries behind their Wings, which at a proper Time should open and make Way for the horrible Destruction of Cartridges of small Shot from them; and Cannon planted almost unseen on their Entrenchments, pointed Breast high, and loaded so as to do dreadful Execution, while their own Forces were almost secure from Danger by being entrench'd up to the Neck: And in short they had so contriv'd it, that we had beside a
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more numerous and gallant Army the utmost Execution of near three hundred Pieces of Cannon to encounter with, while our own could scarce have a Possibility of being of any Use to us, or Harm to them.

Such was their Contrivance, and Disposition, admirably design'd upon the Plan of all their Operations, not to dispute a glorious Victory in the open Field, but to prevent our raising their Siege: Not to conquer, but to destroy us, and that with the least Loss on their own Side that could be contriv'd for. Many of the less thinking among the Politicians of our Coffee-Houses have wondered, that after they saw us repuls'd with so much Loss, they did not push their Success, and endeavour to destroy us in our Retreat, but such should consider that a People so cunning as our Enemies, look at the Design and wish'd Event of Wars, more than at the immediate Circumstances of them, and therefore determin'd that it was not their Business to gain a compleat Victory over us, but to preserve themselves, when they had destroyed a sufficient Number of us, to prevent our molesting their Operations; and that not a Victory over the Allied Forces (though they congratulated themselves on such an Event falling in to their other good Fortune) but the taking *Tournay* was the Point they were labouring at, the End and Design of their present Operations: And for us they at that
Time

Time wanted no more than to prevent our molesting them while they were about it. And for this End how judiciously did they form all their Measures? While we spent two whole Days in only observing their Motions, they who knew the Consequence of this would be a Resolution to attack them, spent their Time in raising such Batteries and making such other Preparations as we dreadfully felt the Effects of in the Action; they had judg'd so well of, and indeed so far determined by their own Position, the Manner in which we must begin the Attack, that they had erected two Batteries of such Strength and so impenetrably guarded, that it could be only our Destruction to attack them, in such Places that they knew our Troops must pass directly between them, and be wholly exposed to the Fire of Both, and laid others in Ambush behind Walls to which they knew they should lead us by, with Orders to the Engineers not to appear till at a certain Signal of our Troops being within their Reach; and not to fire a Shot till they were sure that every one they did fire must take Place, and 'tis no wonder that such Orders as punctually obeyed as wisely given, were followed by the Slaughter of Multitudes of Troops, few of whose Officers were aware of them, and those who were, less afraid, many of them, of being sacrificed
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to them, than of being branded with a mistaken Censure of Cowardice, for daring to evade them. Such was the Conduct, and such the Stratagems of the *French*; which, indeed, succeeded but too well for us, and before which our Troops, though infinitely superior in Strength, could not stand, but left them as much Victory as they wanted, and a Certainty of becoming Masters of the Town.

But, as we have observed before, that there was no Possibility of foreseeing that this would be the Event, but, on the Contrary, that there was all the Reason in the World to expect a glorious Victory, and the Relief of the Town: In short, that the Event of the Action might have been as glorious as the Attempt was brave and laudable, 'tis time to examine how so noble a Victory as we hoped to gain, became changed into so unhappy a Defeat.

In order to this, let us look back, then, on the Disposition of the *French*, and with the same Impartiality we have hitherto used, proceed to enquire where lay the Cause of the Defeat, by beginning with examining our own, looking into what was done, and what might have been done; what our Generals did, and what, in all human Probability, the famed Commanders of the last Age would have done in the same Circumstances.

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Our first Step was the marching immediately up to the Enemy, and encamping within Musket-Shot of their advanced Posts; and the next, the driving them from all their several little Posts between our own Camp and theirs, forcing them up the Hill to their own Camp, and leaving the Detachments of our own Troops, which had performed this Service, in the Posts they had driven them from: And now the Way was clear, between us and their Camp, of all things that could obstruct or divert the grand Design; the next thing done, was the attacking the Enemy in the Morning, before it was possible, as we imagined, that they could expect us. We have already seen the Disposition of the *French*, in Regard to which, His Royal Highness's Dispositions were as follows: Brigadier *Ingoldsby*, a Man highly and worthily in his Esteem and Confidence, he commanded with four good Battalions and three Pieces of Cannon to attack the Village of *Vezon*, in which there was a Fort mounted with large Cannon, Sword in Hand; while Prince *Waldeck* in the same Manner attacked that of *Fontenoy*; Lieutenant-General *Campbell* with fifteen Squadrons to cover the Infantry of the Right-Wing, while forming: And as the Benefit of this Disposition was unfortunately lost, by the unhappy Death of that gallant Officer, his Highness sent in
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its Place seven Pieces of Cannon, to silence the moving Batteries of the Enemy, that broke those Ranks while they were forming. And what other Disposition but this, in these Circumstances, could the Duke of *Marlborough's* self have made? or how proceeded, but as his Highness did? I think it must be evident to every thinking Man, that any other Order must have been worse; and I would ask our shallow Politicians, who are so loud in exclaiming against this, whether they would have attacked the Enemy without Stop or Stay, as soon as they came up with them, and led the Infantry, fatigued with so long a March, immediately to the Attack, open to all the Annoyances of the Enemy, and not prepared any Way to make the best of their own Efforts against them? Or whether it is the Order for beginning with attacking the Batteries that has incurred their Displeasure; and they would have had us march against them in certain Expectation of that Slaughter we too severely felt from them, when our best Precautions were ineffectual towards the silencing them?

If then the Disposition and Order of the Attack was right; if the Attack was right in its self, and had all the fair Prospect imaginable of Success; if other Troops, no better than our own, have conquered the same Enemy, at greater Disadvantages;

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and if our Troops did as much as mortal Men could do; all which is evidently true, and yet we were defeated with a dreadful Slaughter; the great Question now naturally and necessarily takes Place, and every one will ask, Why were we so? and by whose Fault was it? I have already answered that it was by no body's: That not our Faults, but our Enemies Virtues, have subdued us. And after declaring how perfectly right we had hitherto been in every Article, to the very charging of the Enemy, all that I shall now pretend to prove is, that after that, there was a Time when we ought to have stopped; that the Cause of our Overthrow was our Confusion from too late Intelligence; and that if the whole Army had been called off as soon as that arrived, we had saved the unavailing Loss of Multitudes of Heroes, and in a few Days more, might have been prepared to meet the Enemy in all their Stratagems; and from a thorough Knowledge and Expectation of their Subtleties, have been provided to evade them; and so, secure of Victory, which it is evident they will never be able to dispute with us, by any other Means.

Not that I can presume to blame the Officers that this was not done; those who have seen an Army in the Terror and Confusion of a first Onset, will know it could not; add to the burning Ardor of our Men,
which

which is not at that Time to be restrained, the Horror and Confusion of many of the Officers who looked on themselves and all their Men as betrayed and devoted to Destruction; the Impatience and Uncertainty of others, the Rage and Anguish of the Commanding Hero's Heart, who had laid so fair a Foundation for raising an immortal Fame that Day, and the almost desperate Hope that true Courage gives of conquering, even against the greatest Disadvantages, and we must cease to wonder that it was not done. Let then the Officers who acted differently in this fatal Crisis, cease their mutual Recriminations, and acknowledge that in such a Scene of Dismay and Horror, where there was neither Time nor Room for Thought, brave and good Men might, from good Principles, be impelled to a different Manner of acting. And as I have already cleared, I presume, the Commanders in Chief from any, the least, Aspersions of Temerity and Rashness in making the Attack, by proving that Attack a just, a proper, and right Action, so I shall endeavour now to vindicate the Characters of the other Officers so freely and so variously censured here, by proving that the same Courage and Love of their Country, might differently inspire them in that Hour of Terror, with different Sentiments of what their Duty required of them; and that they

were no more guilty of the Madnefs, Folly, and Cowardice, they are fo variously accused of here, than the others of that Rashnefs the common Tongue has fo unworthily asperfed their Names with, and which a fair and candid Reason must fo honourably acquit them of.

Men who were ever fo well prepared to do their Duty, and not afraid to face the ugliest Dangers in their common Forms, might yet be terrified, and must be fo, unless they could throw off all the human Passions, on hearing such an Account as was too late industriously spread through all the Ranks, that they should have no fair Play for their Lives; that Traps and Snares and Mines were laid for them in all their Way; that they had Batteries of Cannon and not Battalions of Enemies to fight withal, which was, indeed, in a great Measure true; that every Step they could take was foreseen, nay was prepared for them, and only served to lead them to Destruction; and that the more Bravery they fought with, and the more seeming Success they had, the more sure were they of their inevitable Destruction. Tidings like these, I say, might well, if not intimidate, at least, startle the bravest Commanders; and the sad Alternative of Infamy to retreat, and sure Destruction to advance, keep them a Moment in Suspence, and after urge them on to different Means
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for the same End, the Good and Preservation of their Country. If, in the Midst of this Confusion, one is commanded with his Troops to attack a Squadron, who he knows are ordered not to fight him, but lead him into an Ambush, where he and all under his Command are sure to perish without a Possibility of striking a single Blow in their Defence, may not some other Motive, and not Fear, with-hold him from the Attack, even in Disobedience to the absolute and punctual Commands of his General? And may not such a Man, provided he does his Duty in some more proper Place, whatever the military Laws may determine concerning him, as they are made for general Cases, and cannot be supposed to take in every single, possible Circumstance, may not, and does not such a Man, though devoted to Infamy and Destruction for it, deserve more of his Country than the hot-headed Captain, who from a mistaken Notion of Honour, prefers the sacrificing himself and all that he has under his Command, to the imaginary Infamy of disobeying, in an honest Cause, the Orders of his mistaken General.

If another is commanded with a Body sufficient, in Appearance, for the Design, to attack a Battery, and as he leads his Men to the Engagement, learns that there are ten times his Number to oppose him, be-

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sides that Art and Nature together have made it almost impregnable, even though there were none to defend it; if he determines, on receiving this Intelligence, to stop the March, and, saving the Troops intrusted to his Care, from certain Slaughter, and that in such Circumstances, that their Destruction could be of no Service to the rest, leads them to do their Duty, and to serve their Country in another Place instead of perishing to no Purpose, but to swell the Triumphs of the Enemy in that: Is this good and prudent Officer, after leading on his Men, and fighting at their Head 'till his Wounds will suffer him to hold his Sword no longer, and then exhorting them, with what he thinks his dying Breath, to fight like Men, and prove by their Courage there, that it was not the Want of that, which with-held them from their commanded Station in another Place: To be accused of Cowardice for not having led to inevitable and unavailing Destruction, because the commanding Officer, who allotted him that Post, could no more, at that time, provide against the Numbers, which he could not know of, than he could now supply him with Force sufficient to encounter them? Is such a good and gallant Officer to lose the Fame of a Life full of Glory, gained in his Country's Service long before; because he fought its Good
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and Safety here, by other and by properer Means, than those allotted him for it; let the Laws of War, as I observed in another Case, determine what they will against the Man who thus has dared be honest, even against his Duty, those of Reason and of Conscience, I am sure, will both acquit and applaud him; and the Consciousness of having done what, he was sensible, he ought to have done, will be more satisfactory to him, than the Applauses of a Million.

Should another Captain, when he had broken the Troops it was allotted him to attack, and was leading the brave Soldiers, who had conquered under him, to drive and push them to Destruction in their precipitate Retreat, after receiving Orders from his General to pursue and cut them in Pieces as they were flying before him, just then receive Intelligence that the Slaughter of his Enemies was over, and that his own approached; that he should reach no more the flying Enemy; but was now on the Brink of a Precipice in which he and all under his Command must perish; that a few Steps farther carried him into the Reach of Cannon pointed ready to his Destruction; must he, because he stops the Chace, and leads his victorious Followers to a second Conquest in another Place, be blamed because he did not lead them on
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to known and certain Slaughter there? Must he (because he chose to live to serve, rather than die with all about him, without being of any Good to his Country, and the Cause he went to fight in) be branded with Infamy for his Deserts, and loaded with Reproaches instead of Praises, because he lived and conquered, instead of perishing a Sacrifice to the Stratagems of a designing Enemy?

What, indeed, could be the Thought or Conduct of the Officers in such a Scene of Blood and Terror? where they knew not but their Courage was their Destruction? And what the Courage of the common Soldiery, who knew their Successes only served to lead them into Snares, and more inevitable and irresistible Destruction? And that this was in Reality the very Case, may easily be conceived if we will now, with this Knowledge of the Councils of the Enemy, carefully review the whole Conduct of the Action. I fear upon such an Examination we shall find that the only real Advantage we had over the Enemy, the single Instance in which we may justly be said to have broken and driven them before us, was in the Success of the right Wing of our Infantry, who in their first Onset bore down all before them, and drove the Enemy beyond the Fort and Village, and were at that Time
Masters

Masters of the Field of Battle, even to their Camp. In all the rest I am afraid it will appear too evident that we only seemed to conquer, or prevail, as they designed we should; and that where-ere they fled before us, it was not our Force, but the Commands of their Officers, that occasioned it. But to be more at a Certainty in all this, let us review the whole Conduct and Proceeding of the Battle.

The Industry and Precaution of the *French* was such, that besides being informed of all our Measures, they had provided even for impossible Accidents; defending, and that not slightly neither, Places which Nature's self had, by the Floods and other Accidents, rendered impassible; and for those we should attempt to pass, and the Posts they knew we should want to make ourselves Masters of, they had so strongly guarded and defended them, that unless the whole Efforts of our Army, and joint Skill of all our Generals had been singly employed against every one of them, it was almost impossible we should have become Masters of them; and this they had so cunningly concealed, and so industriously misled us by false Intelligences, that they knew it would appear easy for us to force them, and that we should be sure to send Troops against them, proportioned only to the Strength we were made to believe they

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had, and who must therefore all inevitably perish before them.

Their Batteries which were more numerous than it was possible for us to imagine they could be, were so artfully placed, and so cunningly concealed, that we who had at first believed we knew of all of them, but every where at the Advantages they had of playing their concealed ones, found our Error in that very fatal, easily believed the Report that there were more than indeed there were, and that they were so planted, that the farther we pass'd their Troops we were the more expos'd to their Fire, which was also in some sense true; part of this Strength of theirs they had conceal'd in Woods, and Mills, and Villages; part hid behind natural Ascents of the Ground, part behind Walls that concealed both it and all concerned in the Management of it; and many of these Forts which could not take Place at the Beginning of the Action, had Orders not to fire 'till at a certain Signal given, at a Time when we were absolutely within their reach, and every Bullet must take Place, and part behind their Lines at certain Distances which had Orders to be broke before us, and at a proper Time to separate and leave our Troops the Fire of the Batteries behind them to face instead of their Bayonets. Their Disposition can never be enough admir'd

mir'd, and therefore too they were more secure as well as more in form to annoy us, than we could be in regard to them; their Lines indeed and the Advantage of the Ground were prodigious Assistance to them in this Point; and therefore nothing of their Praise in this Particular is to be understood, as Reflections on our Generals who were the Attackers, and therefore could not have these Advantages, but surely the naming the Advantages their natural Circumstances as well as their Extraordinary Precaution gave them is to our Honour, for it must have been more to our Disgrace, if we had been beaten on more equal Terms.

Their first Precaution was to prevent any Sally from the besieged; in Order to this they left four principal Officers with twenty seven Battallions and some Cavalry before the Place, with Orders how to act, by which they succeeded in this exactly to their Wish, and the Garrison tho' it had been so successful in many former Sallies, and now more than ever wish'd to make one, yet was so watch'd and so expected in all its Motions, that it was impossible for it to attempt it without first engaging these Forces at some monstrous Disadvantage; and this may answer the loud Reproaches of many half thinking People here, who were so vehement in their Exclamations

against them for not doing, as indeed is the general Case, what it was impossible for them to do. All that they could they did, keeping a more dreadful and more continual Fire from all their Batteries all that Day, than ever they had done before or did after it; the Enemy however, succeeded in all they intended, the locking them up from our Assistance.

The next Precaution they took was, to defend the weaker Places of their Camp, &c. An experienced Officer with seven Battalions and fourteen Squadrons, defended the Part between their Bridges and Mount *Trinity*; their best *Hussars* were posted upon the Mount, and two Brigades of Infantry with an Officer of known Courage, were charg'd with the Defence of the Ground between Mount *Trinity*, and the Road to *Leuze*; tho' the Place it self was so defended by Woods, and overflow'd by excessive Rains, that Nature had made it require almost no other Defence.

Besides these Precautions, they had exact Information of all our Motions, and had posted the greatest and strongest Part of their Troops where they knew we should make our principal Efforts against them; and had broke up the Roads, and pull'd down Trees and Houses to embarrass us in our Marching, and particularly to retard the Horse,

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The first Lines of their Infantry were cover'd both on the Right and Left, by the Villages they had contrived to draw them up between, and extended as far as to a third Village, that of *Antoin*, in which they had rais'd two Batteries of Cannon.

The Village of *Fontenoy*, which they knew we should begin by attacking, they had contrived to make us be informed was weak, and not only indefensible, but ill defended, tho' they had at the same Time made it impregnable to all it was possible for us to do against it, by filling and defending it with their most chosen Troops, and entrenching and mounting it; as also the Village of *Antoin*, with Cannon of monstrous Force, this they had been doubly industrious in managing, that they might dishearten us by a Repulse in the first Onset, by as it were inviting us to attack a Place they knew we must lose our Credit before.

Behind the first Line of Infantry, they had two of Cavalry, supported by four Regiments of Dragoons, and extended even to the Village of *Antoin* by a Brigade of Infantry; and in this Posture they waited for our Attack, when upon the determined Signal they were ordered under Arms, and their King put himself at their Head, while the Marshal *Saxe*, rang'd them in order of Battle, detaching one Brigade to the Edge of the Marshes on the Right of the Plain near *Antoin*, lodging a Brigade of *Swiss* in the Redoubts

Redoubts, and another in *Fontenoy*, which Village covered the Right of the first Line, form'd of seven Brigades, while the Left was supported by three other Brigades and the Guards. The Ground between the first and second Redoubts the *Irish* Brigades were commanded to occupy, and after the second Line was form'd, and the two Redoubts fill'd, sixty Squadrons were placed behind in two Lines, extending from *Antoin* to the Road to *Mons*. The Household Troops, the *Gens d'Armes*, and *Carabineers* were placed upon a Parallel with the second Line, and form'd a kind of Body of Reserve, and the Villages, Redoubts, and Front of the Line, contained a Hundred and ten Pieces of Cannon, besides what lay behind, and in Reserve to use at more advantage.

Such was the Disposition of the Troops we were to attack under Disadvantages, not only natural, of which indeed there were too many, but under others their everlasting Vigilance had provided ; for they had first, knowing the determined Time, and Manner of our Attack, left the Way open and easy for the Foot to advance by, but so embarrass'd that by which the Horse were to march cutting down whole Woods, digging deep Trenches in the Defiles, and laying Houses, &c. in Ruins in their Way, that it was impossible they should come up
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of more than three Hours after them. During all which Time, our Foot which it was impossible should begin the Attack for want of the Horse to support them, were expos'd to the continual Fire of three of their strongest Batteries; so that they knew we must be in a Manner beaten before the Battle begun, and so indeed it prov'd, their Certainty of this and of repulsing us in our first great Attack, was not all they had prepared against us; it was a dreadful Method they took of disheartening or at least throwing us into Confusion, by contriving that in the Beginning of the Attack, we should have Intelligence of part of their Designs, which we could not before have guess'd at, as that they intended to destroy us by Stratagem, that all the Places we were destin'd to attack were indeed impregnable, that Batteries we imagin'd guarded by only a few, were supported and defended by the *Gens d' Arms, Musquetaires*, and other chosen Troops in Thousands; and that we ought above all things to fear Success, for that wherever we should conquer, it was but a Prologue to inevitable Destruction. And true it unquestionably is, that we were often suffer'd to drive them from their Posts, with no other View, but for the Slaughter of our selves: I have before observed that it was their Business not so much to conquer, as to destroy us, and all their Measures

fures were laid to that End; Batteries were erected behind, and on every Side, into the Reach of which our Troops were to be brought by the Pursuit of such Part of theirs as had Orders to fly before us, and I fear it will be seen too plainly, if we look over the whole Story of the Battle with this View, that the Allies no where prevailed, but where the *French* designed they should, and where their imaginary Advantage was immediately followed by a greater Slaughter. But this let our Enemies know too, that their having done it once, will be attended with a Certainty, of their never doing it again; that our having once felt the Effect of their Cunning, will be a sure Prevention of our ever suffering by it again, and that the next Battle, they must not expect us so to be led into Traps and Snares, but be compell'd to fly as precipitately, and as often in earnest, as they now pretended it; and who is there among us can blame the Officer who aware of this, and taught by the sad Destruction of the neighbouring Ranks turn'd his own to where they might dispute the Conquest on more equal Terms, tho' in Disobedience to the Command of his Superior, who could not be every where at once, nor know the Certainty of that Destruction his Commands allotted him too? Or where is the Cowardise of another who stops, tho' commanded to pursue an Enemy,

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who he knows flies only to lead him to certain Slaughter, and whom he sees he never can come up with. If indeed the subsequent Conduct of these People argues them afraid of the Dangers they ought to face, then let us plead no longer for them; but if we see them the Remainder of the Day acting the Part of brave and gallant Men, and that against more Odds than what appeared against them in the Service they avoided, then let us do them the Justice their Courage and well regulated Love of their Country deserves. Instead of this to load them with Infamy and Reproaches, was most unworthy in us, but infinitely more so, was it in themselves to load one another: What could be baser than for one who had been an Eye-Witness of the Merit and gallant Behaviour of a Brother Officer, to give the Lye to his Conscience, and because himself perhaps had acted worse, than he would have it believed the Person did, whom he accuses, blacken not only him, but Numbers beside, to bring them down to his own Stamp, that he might share the Infamy alone. Doubtless the Martial Laws are, and ought to be, severe; but a sober, just, and honest Executor of them has unquestionably the same Right as we. With our Forms of Law in civil Cases, the Life and general Character of a Criminal is always as strictly enquired into as the

particular Circumstances of the Crime, and as often destroys, or saves him, and surely should not we allow and hope the same Impartiality and equitable Way of administering Justice there? And when that is allowed, I hope the warmest Accusers of the Officers most censur'd at present, will allow he could fear nothing from so fair a Trial, indeed if any Form of Justice could authorize the censuring or punishing a Man for such Behaviour as his has been, It would be the strongest Instance of the *Summum jus summa injuria* that ever the World produced.

But above all others, the daring and undaunted Censures, so plentifully bestowed on one whose Courage and Conduct ought even more than his Dignity to have exempted him from them, are least to be forgiven. Why but for the Delight of Scandal, the eager Love of Defamation, particularly of the Great, could any the most harden'd Mouth, presume to breathe a Censure on his Name? His Behaviour indeed is the true Answer to such shameless Raillery, and we need but bid them look over the Accounts of that, whether given by Friends, or Enemies, and they must blush, if they can do so, for having been so foolishly, as well as insolently and wickedly malicious. The general Disposition and Order of our Army, as well as the Resolution of attacking the
 Enemy

Enemy, have, I hope, already been proved sufficiently to be just, brave and prudent : The First, such as the Duke of *Marlborough's* self, could not in all human Probability have mended, and the other, what our Duty, Interest, nay Necessity required ; and what the Man who could have evaded doing, had never deserved the Name of *Englishman* after : But granting even that all these had been wrong, why is the Weight of all to lie upon his Shoulders ? Why he alone to be accus'd of the Occasions of our Misfortune ? Were not all these Things determined at a general Council of War ? And was it not the joint Opinion of young and old, of the unexperienced, as well as those who ended that Life they had spent in the Service of their Country in the Execution of those Designs and Resolutions, that all these Steps should be taken ? And for what are his own private Actions, and for which he is alone accountable, have they not every where been such as a Nation zealous for its Honour, would wish its Prince to have done ? Was he not more vigilant than even the common Soldiery, for Days before the Battle ? Where do we find him in the Moment of the general Attack, but at the Head of the Lines, leading them up, directly to the Enemy ? And how employ'd in the Time of the Action, but in sending Reinforcements to the weaker Parts ? Assist-

ing, and pushing to the utmost the Advantages we gain'd ; and recovering, and rallying the disheartned Troops, inspiring them as much by his Example as his Words, to act like what they were, the best and bravest Forces of the World? He was every where exposed as much as the meanest Soldier, and in the midst of the greatest Disorder, Confusion, and most imminent Dangers : Constantly in the Heat of the Action encouraging the Men, rallying them when broken, leading them to the Charge ; and this with as much Intrepidity, as Calmness : This is his Royal Highness's true Character, with all that saw him in the Action ; even his Enemies, who while they envy us, the Honour of such a Prince, little imagine there are a set of People among us ready to misconstrue all his Actions, and determined to believe, or at least pretend and say that they believe him, such as it is the Interest of his Enemies indeed to wish him. If there be any so hardened as not to believe even their Praises, let them at least believe those who have shared the Bounties, as well as seen the Bravery of his Temper, and own that he could not with his own Hand have rewarded the Trooper who chose to do any Service, rather than be idle in a Day of such Importance, at the very Time of that Service, unless he also had been present at it ; nor could have chear'd the Highlander by a Promise of something better than
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the Arm he saw drop from him, unless he had also shared the Glory and the Danger of that dreadful Hour. In short, all who were present, and could be Judges of the Truth, declare the Dauphin, whom the *French* affect so much to praise, to be a raw and unexperinced Child, the Duke a prudent and a gallant Officer, the Dauphin to have done nothing, the Duke every thing that could be expected; nay, that could be wished from an Officer in his Station; and that he has, by his own Conduct, deserved more than all the Glory he had laid the Plan of gaining in this unhappy Day.

Upon the whole I cannot think the *French* have much to congratulate themselves upon on their Advantage; which, notwithstanding all their Precautions for the sparing their Men, has, by all Accounts, cost them as many as our Defeat has us; and had they dared to have engaged us more openly, I believe the Behaviour of our Troops has made it evident, that they would have felt a severer Loss than any they have known since the Days of the late Duke of *Marlborough*. The Officers, as much as we have seemed dissatisfied with their Behaviour here, are in as high and just Esteem with the Soldiers (and surely all our Prejudices cannot prevent our acknowledging that they are the best Judges in what Degree they deserved it) as their Sol-
diers

diers are with them; the one are sensible that with the Experience of the Stratagems of this Day, they have Officers capable of leading them to Conquest, against all the Disadvantages of their own Troops, except in that one great Attack of the *English* Infantry, before mentioned, and of which the *French* themselves give this honourable Account. “ They (we) afterwards made an Attempt to penetrate through their Line of Infantry, in which we succeeded, for our Infantry who had formed themselves in a very strong Line of Battle charged, and at their second Charge penetrated through the Brigade of Guards, who retired upon the *Irish* Regiments of *Clare*, and *Rott*; their Cavalry, which advanced before them immediately, could not sustain the terrible Fire made by that Line of Infantry, inso-much, that for more than an Hour we had a very remarkable, and considerable Advantage, and that several of their Squadrons rallied, but were again repulsed by the prodigious Fire of our Infantry.” But for the rest, let us examine it from first to last, and I am afraid it will appear that we were only acting according to the Design, and putting in force the Measures the Enemy had provided for us; and that wherever they fled before us, it was with the double View of saving their own Troops, and leading us in the Pursuit into the Reach of Cannon,

Cannon, which would destroy us, at a cheaper Rate to them, than the Loss it would cost their Battalions to have done it. But to be the more satisfied of this, let us review the Order of the general Attack.

About seven o'Clock in the Morning, the Remainder of our shattered Infantry began to charge this powerful Enemy, who were yet unhurt, and had been for more than three Hours the pleased Spectators of the Destruction their Artillery had been making all that time among us. We began as our Enemy had designed we should, and expected to see us, by making two successive Attacks on the Village of *Fontenoy*, which they had made impregnable. The greater our Courage was in making these Attacks, the greater was not only our Loss, but the more were our Troops dispirited by the vigorous Repulses they met in both, insomuch that not all their own innate Bravery, nor the utmost Efforts of their Officers could lead them to a Third; thus far all had exactly answered the Expectation of the Enemy, nor was the next Step less to their Advantage, tho' unexpected, and unprovided against; this was the Motion of the Cavalry of our left Wing, to attack their Right, but our Squadrons had been so terribly slaughtered during the whole Morning by the Cannon of *Antoin*,
Fontenoy,

Fontenoy, and the Mill of *Calonne*, that had taken them in Flank, that on Sight of the Thinness of their own Ranks, and the Fullness of the Body that marched to attack them, they were, in common Prudence, obliged to retire without attempting what their Courage, before it knew the Odds, had intended; this the *French* looked on as no less than a Token of Despair, and were more than they had expected elated with their Success. When the Courage and Force of the *English* Infantry, before recorded, turned the Tide of Success for more than an Hour, and taught them to despair in their Turn, till after an obstinate Dispute on all Sides, the Household Troops and Bodies of fresh Infantry, obliged us to retire, and lose the Advantage we had once so bravely gained: And this had never been effected, had our Infantry been in the Condition they were led forth in; but where can be the Wonder that Troops almost destroyed before they began the Battle, could not stand before the whole, and unhurt, Force, of all the *French* Battalions. This was, indeed, eminently and evidently a Success, and such, as but for the unhappy Loss before, would have assuredly been followed by a glorious Victory; but for the rest, when we every where see our imaginary Success more fatal to us than our Repulses, when we constantly find more
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fall in pursuing than in flying is it not easy to guess the Cause, and see that the *French*, who are not used to see us flying, or repulsed, dared not so far trust to the Success of all their Stratagems, as to expect to see it; and consequently had no Precaution to gall us while we were doing it, but had every where laid Snares and Destruction for us in the Paths by which they had intended to lead us to pursue them, by those Batteries, which just when we began the Attack, they had let us know it was in vain for us to attempt to drive them from.

Who cannot see, when examining the whole in this Light, that the Success we boast in driving the Enemy from their first Knee-deep Intrenchment into another, which they had dug Nose-high, as we express it, was but of their own contriving? and that their Officers had ordered them to fly so far before us, where they were immediately buried in a deep Intrenchment, out of all reach of our Shot, and we exposed to the immediate and incessant Fire of a Multitude of Cannon planted just breast-high, with their Muzzles only appearing above the Earth; a Destruction, it was as impossible for us to avoid, as to have foreseen: To what Intent was the burying those Cannon, but that it might be impossible for us to be aware of them, 'till we were upon them? and what Use could they have proposed to

have made of them, if their own Troops had stood their Ground? These Cannon could never come into Use but by their retiring behind them, consequently their Flight to this Entrenchment, where they were absolutely secured from us, and in a tenfold Capacity of annoying us, which we boast of as the Effect of the Valour of our Troops in charging them, was done by the Order of their Officers to save themselves, and lead us into Destruction; and was so far from being the Effect of any Action of ours, that it was evidently a concerted Scheme, a thing determined by the Officers of the *French* Army, before the Battle began.

Is it not as easy to be seen why another Body of our Forces were led after the Enemy, who retired too fast to give them Time to fire upon them, just to the Head of their first Entrenchment, in the passing of which, they found themselves in the Reach of a terrible Battery of twenty five Pieces of Cannon, which they knew nothing of 'till then; nor had the least Dread or Expectation of 'till they felt them discharging Chain-Shot and Patridge through a Wood so violently on their Flank, that it was some time before they could determine which Way was readiest to fly them by, which they did not do without a dreadful Slaughter. They then unquestionably perceived why the Enemy had been so ready in retiring before them; and

and I think we, unless we will suppose the *French* had planted those Cannon to fire upon their own Troops, cannot but see ours were not carried into their Reach by Accident, or by their Bravery or Warmth in the Pursuit, but led into the Snare by the Brigades that shammed a disorderly Retreat before us, and could afterwards smile from behind, to see us fall without their endangering themselves, or spilling a Drop of Blood about us.

Our Centre in the same manner found in a few Moments that they had the Mouths of Cannon, and not the Troops to face them, which they were marching to attack; and after in vain endeavouring to advance in the midst of the Fire of these dreadful Batteries, 'till they were too much thin'd in their Ranks to be able to support an Attack, were forced to retire without doing almost any thing.

And is it not as evident that the Retreat of the left Wing of the *French*, which we imagined was made to avoid coming to an Engagement Sword in Hand with us, had another Cause; I do allow the *French* were, without Doubt, as much afraid of such an Engagement as we can suppose them to be; but will it not be evident that their Retreat from us was a designed and determined thing, when we observe that they only retreated 'till they had brought us in
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the imaginary Pursuit of them, to a proper and appointed Place, where they opened and as it were disappeared, drawing away hastily on each Side, and uncovered two great Batteries of Guns, charg'd with Cartridge and small Shot, which we scarce sooner saw than felt; and which made so terrible a Fire in Front and Flank, that the Pursuers were oblig'd to give way, and fall upon the Second Line who were to support them in this imaginary Advantage.


Another Body of us tempted by the seeming Weakness of *Betten's* and *Crellon's* Brigades, marched up in two Lines of Infantry and Cavalry, with several Pieces of Cannon to attack them, and were suffered quietly to march just so far as it was proper for the *French* they should, when in an instant instead of the Prospect of beating and driving from their Ports, what they thought the weakest Part of the Enemy; they found themselves between the Cannon of two formidable Redoubts, one of which as they were almost close under it, did most dreadful Execution, and it was not without the Loss of more than half the People, that they could at last get out of this palpable Snare, retiring in Disorder between cross Fires, both of Cannon and small Arms, and leaving all their Artillery behind them in Possession of the Brigades, they thought so easily to have destroyed. Thus was the
 Battle

Battle carried thro', from the Beginning to the End, as the *French* had determined it, and their Stratagems every where so well took Place, that it is a Question, whether a single Piece of Cannon in all their numerous Artillery miss'd the very Slaughter that was appointed to its share; and their Forces, except where they before determined they should fly to lead us into Snares, were not to be broken by all our Force; the eminent Instance of which is in the Attempts of our left Wing, which tho' headed by as good an Officer as perhaps any of the present Age, favour'd by the Fire of our Batteries, and supported by two fresh Battalions of *English* whom his Royal Highness sent to favour the Attack, could do nothing against them, nor gain the least Advantage.

Thus then was this memorable Battle lost, not by the Rashness of our Commanders, not by the Cowardice of the other Officers, as has been most unworthily reported among us, nor by the superior Strength or Courage of our Enemies, but by their superior Art: We were beaten by Stratagem, and that let us do both our Enemies and our selves the Justice to confess, the best and perfectest, the subtlest laid, and best conducted of any military Scene of Stratagem, since the Creation of the World neither our Officers nor Soldiers, however,
have

have at all the worse Opinion of each other for this Misfortune; the one sensible they have Leaders equal to all Stratagems, as well as brave enough to encounter all Dangers, and the other, that they have Soldiers to command to whose Courage and Resolution nothing is impracticable; both desiring with Eagerness and Impatience another Battle, and neither doubting as neither need, but that they shall regain by it more than the Credit they are suppos'd to have lost by this; but in all Probability the *French* who know this, and know both themselves and us too well to doubt the Truth of it, will be as careful to avoid as the others watchful to find an Opportunity: Whenever that does offer may they be better advis'd of the Subtleties of their cunning Enemy, and more prepared to meet them, and then I make no doubt of their turning more than all their intended Mischief on themselves.

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